



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

THE OPPORTUNITY OF JAPAN

By Thorstein Veblen, Ph.D., University of Missouri

What is here intended by "the opportunity of Japan" is not so much an outlook of prospective gain for the Japanese people as of aggrandizement for the Japanese State. It will hold true in this instance as in so many others that the advantage of the country's population does not in any sensible degree coincide with that of its directorate, except it be in point of sentiment. For any modern people imbued with a sense of loyalty to their rulers—as is eminently the case with the Japanese people—the dynastic ambitions of their masters are necessarily an object of veneration, and any political success scored by their rulers is of course a source of gratification. And it may fairly be left an open question whether this sentimental value which the people so attach to the political gains achieved by their government is to be rated as a sufficiently substantial matter to admit speaking of these political successes as a substantial gain for the people at large. To speak of any more substantial gain presumed to accrue to the common man from these manoeuvres of political aggrandizement—anything like a material advantage, e.g.—would be out of the question, except, of course, in a patriotic harangue. The cost of such dynastic aggrandizement falls, of course, on the people at large; and equally of course—except in patriotic harangues—such material gains as may accrue from these political successes fall, equally of course, directly to the personnel of the governing class, together with a certain contingent of enterprising business men who are under modern conditions necessary to the conduct of any national enterprise and are in a position to profit by that trade that is said to "follow the flag." This will necessarily hold true with less qualification the more the country's government partakes of that character of absolute and irresponsible

mastery that has been exemplified in medieval and early modern Europe—as, e.g., the Ancient Régime under the Grand Monarch, or, again, the Imperial Régime in Germany under William II; and it holds true in an eminent degree for Japan, where absolute and irresponsible rule is more securely established than it has been in any European power of the first class, barring Turkey perhaps. To the Japanese government, or “State,” the country, with its human denizens, is an estate to be husbanded and exploited for the State’s ends; which comes near saying, for the prestige of the Mikado’s government.

In the material respect, therefore, the division of interest as between the people at large and the governing class is particularly well marked and well maintained; being, indeed, a division after the same fashion as that which holds between servant and master in any community that is organised on a servile footing. So that the people at large, the common man, has no appreciable share and no substantial concern in the measures taken by the governmental agencies, or even in the deliberations of that advisory board of nobility and gentry that has, under the constitution, been installed under the rubric, “Parliament.” In effect, the people at large are the government’s chattels, to be bred, fed, trained and consumed as the shrewd economy of dynastic politics may best require. All this is well enough known, though it is not commonly spoken of in such naïve terms. The government established by the revolution, or “restoration,” of Meiji is of the nature of an autonomous coöptative bureaucracy, made up out of certain lines and cliques of the nobility (to some extent of a bureaucratic origin), backed by the loyal adhesion of a large body of gentry which differs from the displaced Samurai in its workday avocations rather than in its spirit of aristocratic fealty or its substantially parasitic livelihood. In point of its substantial powers, as in point of substantial accountability, the current bureaucratic organisation that does business in the name of the Mikado apparently differs in no sensible degree from the Shogunate which it displaced. The emperor is now paraded instead of being

retired behind the screen, and there is much ceremonial dust thrown up about his ostensible share in the measures taken by the bureaucratic directorate; all of which is, doubtless, good management. The powers of the crown—except as they are construed to be identical with the powers of the cabinet—are apparently of much the same *fainéantise* nature as they were under the earlier dispensation, prior to 1868. Of course, none of this characterisation is intended in the least to question or deprecate that peculiar and well-authenticated emanation of virtuous influence whereby this divine ruler magically or preternaturally animates his official servants and, at a farther remove, his subjects more at large; but it is to be noted that apart from such magical control, after the pattern of “absent treatment,” it is not evident that the incumbent of the throne exerts any initiative, choice, impulse, guidance or check in the affairs of state. Power vests in a self-appointed, self-authenticating aristocratic cabinet—under the mask of a piously nourished monarchical fiction—with the advice, but without the consent, of a “parliament” endowed with advisory power.¹

This bureaucratic organ of control is still animated with the “Spirit of Old Japan,” and it still rests on and draws its force from a population animated with the same feudalistic spirit. It is, hitherto, only in respect of its material ways and means, its technological equipment and information, that the “New Japan” differs from the old. That superficial reorganisation and amelioration of its civil and political institutions that went into effect in the Restoration has not yet had time to remove the spiritual landmarks of feudalism or appreciably to weaken the servile-aristocratic bias that still guides the intrigues of the court circle, the policies of state, and the larger manoeuvres of diplomacy.

It is in this unique combination of a high-wrought spirit of feudalistic fealty and chivalric honor with the material efficiency given by the modern technology that the strength

¹ See, e. g., the very useful manual on *The Evolution of New Japan*, by Joseph H. Longford, where this complexion of things Japanese is set out in an admirably lucid and succinct manner, although it is apparently done unintentionally and perhaps even unconsciously.

of the Japanese nation lies. In this respect—in being able anachronistically to combine the use of modern technical ways and means with the medieval spirit of servile solidarity—the position of the Japanese government is not unique except in the eminent degree of its successful operation. The several governments of Europe are also, and with a varying measure of success, endeavoring similarly to exploit the modern state of the industrial arts by recourse to the servile patriotism of the common man, and for the purposes of a dynastic politics that is substantially of a medieval character; but in respect of the measure of success which this anachronistic enterprise meets with, these European powers, while differing greatly among themselves, each and several fall short of the Japanese pattern by a long interval.

With great, perhaps with exceptional facility, the Japanese have been taking over and assimilating the industrial ways and means offered by the technological knowledge and the material sciences of the Western peoples. But, except in the most superficial fashion, their habituation to these technological ways and means and to this matter-of-fact insight in the domain of the material sciences has not yet had its effect on the spiritual outlook and sentimental convictions of the people; nor have these borrowed achievements in the field of matter-of-fact seriously begun to dismantle and reshape those matters of imputation that make up the working specifications of the institutional fabric, the ethical (sentimental) values and conventional principles of conduct by force of which it holds true that “man lives not by bread alone.” The Japanese people are learning to gain their “bread” (their fish and rice) by use of the modern, Western state of the industrial arts, but they still conduct their life and spend their endeavor in the light of those principles and with an untroubled view to those values that have been handed down from a now obsolescent state of industry and economic organisation in their own recent medieval past.

In a measure their case is paralleled by that of the German people, e.g., who have recently made an analogous but less immoderate and less precipitate move out of medieval-

ism into the modern system of industry and science; and in the like analogous way the German people, carrying over much of the servile-aristocratic spirit of medievalism into their bureaucratic and irresponsible imperial present, have allowed their new-found technological efficiency to be turned to the service of dynastic politics; though herein, again, the rate and ratio of enhanced achievement on the part of the Germans fall short of the spectacular sweep of the Japanese. And by the way, it should be something more than a blind historical accident when the Japanese committee of bureaucrats have found it to their account to draw so largely as they have done from the example of German bureaucratic imperialism, both in their constitutional reorganisation and in the excessively devious and irresponsible ways of their diplomacy.

An analogy farther afield and to a different effect, and yet perhaps even more suggestive in its way, may be found in the case of the English people and their history, both in the industrial and the political respect; but here the analogy is more valuable for its contrasts than for any direct parallelism it may afford. Taking their case over the long run it will be found that, like the Japanese, the English have been a nation of borrowers, particularly borrowers of technological elements. But their borrowings have been extended over an incomparably longer interval of history and have in no case involved so abrupt a break with the people's own cultural past, having commonly been drawn from neighbors occupying a technological plane not conspicuously more advanced than the state of the industrial arts already previously at the command of the English community. And the technological borrowing of the English virtually ceased at a date so far in the past as already to have allowed all borrowed elements not only to be fully assimilated in a virtually home-bred technological system, but also to have so far worked out their secondary, institutional, consequences as to afford an object lesson of what the cultural consequences of any such technological borrowing should necessarily be. Down through the middle ages and early modern times the English were, culturally speak-

ing, and particularly in the technological respect, constantly and cumulatively indebted to their Continental neighbors, in a fashion resembling that in which the Japanese throughout their long medieval experience were, culturally, followers and dependents of China and Korea. But there is in the English case this striking feature of contrast as against the current Japanese situation, that while the English borrowed unremittingly, until such time as the course of events threw them into the lead in Europe's industrial advance, their borrowing took effect at so moderate a pace that the consequently changing state of the industrial arts among them had time and scope concomitantly to work out its effect upon the habits of thought of the community, and so to bring about a state of the institutional conventions answering to the altered state of the industrial arts.

It should, then, confidently be presumed that as Japan has with great facility and effect taken over the Occidental state of the industrial arts, so should its population be due, presently and expeditiously, to fall in with the peculiar habits of thought that make the faults and qualities of the Western culture—the spiritual outlook and the principles of conduct and ethical values that have been induced by the exacting discipline of this same state of the industrial arts among the technologically more advanced and mature of the Western peoples. For good or ill, life under the conditions imposed by the modern industrial system, and by that economic system of price, business enterprise, and competitive earning and spending that always goes with it, is in the long run incompatible with the prepossessions of medievalism. So that as soon as her people shall have digested the Western state of science and technology and have assimilated its spiritual contents, the Spirit of Old Japan will, in effect, have been dissipated. Ravelings of its genial tradition will still trail at the skirts of the new era, but as an asset available for the enterprise in dynastic politics the Spirit of Old Japan will have little more than the value of a tale that is told. There will doubtless continue to float through the adolescent brains of Young Japan some yellow vapor of truculence, such as would under other skies

be called *el valor español*, and such as may give rise to occasional exploits of abandon, but the joy of living in obscure privation and contumely for the sake of the Emperor's politics and posthumous fame will be lost to the common man.

The opportunity of imperial Japan as a fearsome power in the world's concert of dynastic politics may by consequence confidently be expected to lie within the historical interval that so intervenes between Japan's acquirement of the Western state of the industrial arts and its consequent, slower but inevitable, falling into line with those materialistic, commercial and spendthrift conceptions of right and honest living that make the outcome among the (Christian) peoples that have gone before along the road of industrial dominion and individual self-help.

The "Spirit of Old Japan" is an institutional matter; that is to say it is a matter of acquired habits of thought, of tradition and training, rather than of native endowment peculiar to the race. As such it is necessarily of a transitory, not to say transient, nature, depending for its maintenance on the continued maintenance of those workday habits of life out of which it has arisen and to which it owes its consistency. Barring such retardation as necessarily attached to the growth of new principles and values induced by new circumstances, a radical change in the material ways and means by which the people live must, here as elsewhere, work a consequent change in the people's scheme of life—in the accepted rule of rights and duties. Ideals, ethical values, principles (habits of thought) induced by the conditions of life in the past must presently give place to a different range of ideals, values and principles, so soon as the range of habituation to which they owe their force has ceased to be operative. The fact that, in the case of the Japanese as in other similar cases, the popular and romantic faith holds the received scheme of habits to be an innate and irreducible specific character peculiar to this people, and therefore holds it to be a national heritage unalterable and indefeasible through the ages—"as it was

in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be," etc.; this romantic prejudice need of course not detain us, since it is itself an integral part in that scheme of habits of thought that comes and goes under the compulsion of shifting circumstance.

The Japanese people should be no exception to the common rule in this respect. The elements engaged in their case are of much the same character as those that have been seen at work in the history of the Western nations, and they should be amenable to the same discipline of those material circumstances that are now coming to condition the national life. So, in point of their racial make-up the Japanese are in very much the same case as the Occidental nations from whom they are now borrowing ways and means and into the midst of whom they are driving their way by help of these borrowed ways and means.

It is, of course, not intended to claim that there subsists anything like an identity of race, as between the Japanese and the Christian nations, nor even a particularly near or intimate ethnic relationship; but the run of the well known facts is sufficiently convincing to the effect that the Japanese people readily fall into the same ways of thinking and reasoning, that they readily assimilate the same manner of theoretical constructions in science and technology, that the same scheme of conceptual values and logical sequence carries conviction in Japan as in the Occident. Their intellectual perspective is so nearly the same that the same facts, seen in the same connection, are convincing to the same effect. It need by no means imply an inclusive psychological identity or duplication, but the facility and effect with which the Japanese are taking to Western habits of thought in matters of technology and scientific knowledge shows a sufficiently convincing equality or equivalence between them and their Western fellow men in respect of their intellectual make-up.

This intellectual similarity or psychological equivalence will stand out in relief when the Japanese case is contrasted with what has befallen certain other peoples, racially alien to the bearers of the Western culture, such as the Negro,

Polynesian, or East Indian. These others have been exposed to the Occidental technological system—the system of the machine industry—but they have been brought to no effectual comprehension of the logic and efficiency of the Western technological equipment, have not acquired or assimilated the drift and bias of the material science of the West, and have, even under hard compulsion, been unable to effect anything like a practicable working arrangement with the Occidental system of mechanical efficiency and economic control.

And even as the Japanese show this facile apprehension of Occidental methods and values in the domain of material knowledge, so also is there apparently a close resemblance in point of emotional complexion, suggested, e.g., by the close similarity between the feudal system as it has prevailed in Japan and, in its time, in Western Europe. Similar material circumstances, particularly in respect of the industrial arts, appear to have induced similar institutional results and a parallel range of ideals and ethical values, such as would presume a somewhat closely similar run of human nature in the two cases.

This similarity in point of native traits, if so it can be called, is due not to an identity of race but rather to a parallelism in racial composition. Like the peoples of Christendom, and more particularly like that group of peoples that cluster about the North Sea, and that make up the center of diffusion of the Western culture, the Japanese are, racially, a hybrid population. The several racial elements that go to make up the hybrid mixture are, of course, not the same in the two cases under comparison, nor are they, perhaps, at all nearly related in point of racial derivation. But both of these two contrasted populations alike show that wide-ranging variability of individuals that is characteristic of hybrid peoples, both in the absence of uniformity in respect of physical type and in their relatively great variety of intellectual and spiritual endowment, both in degree and in kind. This variability of these hybrid peoples becomes more obvious when they are contrasted with peoples of relatively unmixed stock, or even with the

average run of mankind at large. Indeed, it may be set down as an earmark of hybridism. It is a factor of serious consequence for the cultural scheme of any such population, particularly for its stability; since such a wide-fluctuating variability of individuals within any given community will give, in effect, a large available flexibility of type, and so will afford a wide and facile susceptibility to new ideas and new grounds of action.

Such being the character of the human raw material in and by which the Japanese situation is to be worked out, it should presumably follow that, just as the material and matter-of-fact elements of Western civilisation are finding ready lodgment and fertile ground among them, so should these intrusive matter-of-fact conceptions presently, and with celerity, induce the working out of a corresponding fabric of matters of imputation—principles of conduct, articles of faith, social conventions, ethical values. The impersonal and materialistic bias of modern science and technology has among the Western peoples, already gone far to dissipate those putative values on which any feudal and autocratic régime must necessarily rest. And since the same impersonal and materialistic frame of mind proves, to all appearance, to be characteristic of the Japanese, they should also expect presently to experience its spiritual, and therefore its institutional consequences.

Hitherto and for the immediate future, therefore, Japan has the usufruct of the modern state of science and the industrial arts, without the faults of its qualities. But in the long run its faults are as inseparable from this system as its structure. How far these faults or infirmities are to be rated as such at large is a question that need not be argued here. They are infirmities for the imperialistic purposes of Great Nippon, and it should be a matter of no great difficulty to see how and why, or even to see that they are already incipiently in process of realisation. This may be better appreciated on calling to mind certain features of the change that is going forward in the economic circumstances of Japan.

Effectually to turn its usufruct of the Western science and technology to account, it will be necessary for Japan, in all essential respects, to follow the lead given by the Western peoples. Such a course is prescribed by the circumstances of the case; partly in that the modern state of the industrial arts involves a certain kind and degree of popular education and a certain impersonal, mechanistic organisation and coördination of the material equipment (mechanical and human) and of the processes employed; partly because nothing like the full advantage of the methods employed can be had except by entering into close relations of give and take, commercially and otherwise, with the other nations that have adopted the scope and method of the mechanical industry. In its full scope this industrial system is necessarily of an international or cosmopolitan character, and any attempt to work it on narrower than international lines must fall short of that highest efficiency which alone can satisfy the imperialistic needs or the national pride of Japan. It is only by way of commerce and a commercialised industry that Japan can get a footing among the commercial nations of the West; and in this necessary commercialisation of its industry and its economic institutions Japan must in all essential respects accept the scheme as it is already in force among the nations of the West. But the unintended consequences of such a course must also follow.

So, a competent system of communication, internal and external, is of the essence of the case, and in this matter the Japanese are already far on their way, with steamships, railway, telegraph, telephone, postal service and newspapers, as well as an improved and extended system of highways; from which it follows that the isolation, parcelment and consequent homebred animus of the people is already beginning to disappear, and the corresponding clanishness and adhesive loyalty to their hereditary local masters is also in process of decay. The feudal organisation, and the spirit of fealty, rests on an industrial system of self-sufficient local units and on discrepancies of usage and convention as between self-sufficient local organisations.

Again, the modern (Western) state of the industrial arts requires, in order to its efficient working, a relatively high degree of "intelligence," so-called, among the workmen,—it should more accurately be spoken of as a large volume of relatively exact information within the peculiar lines of the material sciences. This involves schooling, of a set and special character, extended far beyond the bounds of what was needed in that way under the earlier industrial system, and specifically it involves, as an imperative requirement, the familiar use of printed matter. (It may be noted by the way that the percentage of illiteracy among the Japanese has fallen off since the Restoration at a rate that is fairly alarming for the stability of the established order.) It is particularly for the sake of matter-of-fact information, serviceable in the mechanically organised system of industry and communication, that this high rate of literacy is indispensable, and the effect of this industrial system and of life organised on these mechanical lines is unavoidably to extend and diffuse information of this kind. At the same time the workday training of the routine of life under this industrial system, and of its ubiquitous and exacting system of communication, goes in a pronouncedly one-sided way to inculcate a matter-of-fact, and especially a materialistic, habit of mind; such as comports ill with those elusive putative verities of occult personal excellence in which the Spirit of Old Japan is grounded. So, e.g., the spread of such matter-of-fact information and such mechanistic conceptions must unavoidably act to dissipate all substantial belief in that *opéra bouffe* mythology that makes up the state religion and supplies the foundation of the Japanese faith in the Emperor's divine pedigree and occult virtues; for these time-worn elements of Shinto are even less viable under the exacting mechanistic discipline of modern industry than are the frayed remnants of the faith that conventionally serve as articles of belief among the Christian peoples.

Under the given conditions, brought on throughout the Western world by the machine industry itself and by the antecedent institutional situation out of which it arose,

this modern state of the industrial arts can be turned to account for the purposes of any national or dynastic ambitions only by the help or through the mediation of a business organisation of the modern kind. No other method of control or exploitation would serve, because no other system of control will articulate with the industrial organisation of those commercial nations with whom coördination and intercourse is requisite to bring the industry of the Japanese people to its best (pecuniary) efficiency. Within the comprehensive community of nations that lies under the dominion of the machine process any degree of isolation counts as a disability. It is a system of interlocking processes; and the mechanism of coördination and commutation in the case is the commercial traffic in which all these communities are engaged. Incompetent, or even puerile, as this commercial enterprise may seem when seen in the large and taken as a means of the international coördination of industry, it still affords the sole method available for the purpose under the given conditions, because it is one of the chief of the given conditions.

This business enterprise under whose tutelage the industrial system is placed does not directly contemplate or concern itself with serviceability to national, dynastic, or collective ends of any kind. It is a matter of individual enterprise, animated by motives of pecuniary gain and carried on on a competitive basis. Wherever it reaches it carries a "commercialisation" of human relations and social standards, and effects a displacement of such aims and values as can not be stated in terms of pecuniary gain; and so it throws pecuniary solvency into that position of first consideration that has once been occupied by pedigree and putative excellences of character.

This pecuniary enterprise that so comes necessarily to take the oversight of the industrial system has certain specific consequences, secondary but essential, which the Japanese community has not yet experienced in full, because the secondary effects of the industrial revolution in Japan have not yet had time to come to a head. The most obvious of these, or at least the one most readily to be stated and

appreciated in concrete (material) terms, is what might be called the "sabotage" of capitalism—the competitive working at cross purposes of rival business concerns and the control of industrial processes by considerations of net gain to the managers rather than of material serviceability. By virtue of this pecuniary control it has come about, in all countries in which the modern industrial system has had time to fall into settled lines, that the equipment is rarely, if ever, worked to its capacity—often, over long intervals, at less than one-half its capacity—and that the products, whether goods or services, are turned out with a view, in respect of kind, time, place and sophistication, to their profitable sale rather than to their serviceable consumption. It is presumably well within the mark to say that by force of this unavoidable capitalistic "sabotage" the industries in the maturer commercial countries fall short of their theoretically normal efficiency by something more than fifty per cent. The new era in Japan has not yet reached this stage of economic maturity, but there is no reason to presume a different outcome for Japan in this respect, given the necessary time for adjustment.

With competitive gain as the legitimate end of endeavor comes also competitive spending as its legitimate counterfoil, leading to a ubiquitous system of "conspicuous waste." With this canon of right pecuniary living, reinforced by the new ethical principles of self-help and commercial solvency, comes in as a bench-mark in public life the well-worn principle of modern politics that "public office is a means of private gain." Hence the comprehensive system of "graft" that envelops all civilised affairs of state, and that once, e.g., allowed the great organisation of Russian officials to be defeated by the Japanese. This phase of civilisation must also of right come to the Japanese in due course of maturity.

So, again, through the competitive wage system, as well as by other channels of commercial indoctrination, the same principle of competitive consumption comes to permeate the industrial population and presently induces a higher standard of living, or more accurately of expendi-

ture; which cuts into the disposable margin of production above cost, that might otherwise be drawn to the service of imperial politics.

It would of course be hazardous to guess how long an interval must necessarily elapse between Japan's acquirement of the Western state of the industrial arts and the consequent disintegration of that Spirit of Old Japan that still is the chief asset of the state as a warlike power; but it may be accepted without hazard that such must be the event, sooner or later. And it is within this interval that Japan's opportunity lies. The spiritual disintegration has already visibly set in, under all the several forms of modernisation spoken of above, but it is presumably still safe to say that hitherto the rate of gross gain in material efficiency due to the new scientific and technological knowledge is more than sufficient to offset this incipient spiritual deterioration; so that while the climax of the nation's net efficiency as a political or warlike force lies yet in the future, it would seem at least to lie in the calculable future. When this critical point in the country's growing maturity under the new economic dispensation shall be passed, when Japan shall have reached the plane of materialism and commercialisation occupied by the Christian nations, in respect of pecuniary ideals and self-help as well as of technological efficiency; then the advantage that now visibly inures to the government of Japan from the anomalous cultural situation of that country should be at an end, and the efficiency of the Japanese national organization should then presumably fall to the same level of efficiency per unit of men and of expenditure as is now occupied by the older peoples within the European community of nations. It is the present high efficiency of the Japanese, an efficiency which may be formulated as an exceptionally wide margin between cost of production and output of military force—it is this that makes Japan formidable in the eyes of her Western competitors for imperial honors, and in substance it is this on which the Japanese masters of political intrigue rest their sanguine hopes of empire.

As already implied in what has been said above, the Japanese, statesmen and subjects, seeing the rapid rate of gain already made in material efficiency, and failing to see what their own experience has not taught them, that the new industrial era carries the faults of its own qualities; seeing the coefficient of gain, and not discounting the yet incipiently operative coefficient of loss, they count on the present rate of gross gain as a secure basis of prospective net gain. But from the considerations set forth above it follows that if this new-found efficiency is to serve the turn for the dynastic aggrandizement of Japan, it must be turned to account before the cumulatively accelerating rate of institutional deterioration overtakes and neutralises the cumulatively declining rate of gain in material efficiency; which should, humanly speaking, mean that Japan must strike, if at all, within the effective lifetime of the generation that is now coming to maturity. For, facile as the Japanese people have shown themselves to be, there is no reason to doubt that the commercialisation of Japan should be passably complete within that period. It is, therefore, also contained in the premises that, in order to an (imperialistically) successful issue, the imperial government must throw all its available force, without reservation, into one headlong rush; since in the nature of the case no second opportunity of the kind is to be looked for.